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Fiscal	Incentives	and	Direct	Foreign	Investment	in	Less	Developed	Countries	
By	David	Lim*	
This	study	found	no	support	for	the	belief	by	the	governments	of	most	less	developed	
countries	(LDCs)	that	the	provision	of	fiscal	incentives	is	necessary	to	attract	direct	foreign	
investment	and	that	the	greater	the	generosity	of	these	incentive	programmes	the	greater	
would	be	the	level	of	such	investment.	What	muttered	were	the	presence	of	natural	
resources	and	a	proven	record	of	economic	performance.	The	provision	of	incentives	could	
not	compensate	for	the	absence	of	either	of	these	two	factors.	The	study	is	a	cross-sectional	
one	of	27	LDCs	for	the	period	1965-73.	
I	
Almost	all	the	governments	of	less	developed	countries	(LDCs)	provide	fiscal	incentives	in	
the	belief	that	these	encourage	a	higher	level	of	direct	foreign	investment.	A	corollary	of	
this	is	the	belief	that	the	greater	the	generosity	of	the	incentive	programme,	the	greater	will	
be	the	level	of	direct	foreign	investment	attracted.	Thus	if	F	measures	the	level	of	direct	
foreign	investment	and	IG	the	generosity	of	the	incentive	package,	then,	
	 F	=	f1(IG)	 (1)	
where	F	and	IG	are	expected	to	be	positively	related.	
At	the	same	time	it	is	argued	that	the	level	of	direct	foreign	investment	will	also	be	
enhanced	by	the	presence	of	natural	resources	and	by	a	proven	record	of	economic	
performance.	Thus	if	ME	measures	the	availability	of	natural	resources	and	ED	and	GR	the	
level	of	economic	development	and	the	rate	of	economic	growth	respectively,	equation	(1)	
can	be	expanded	to	
	 F	=	f2(IG,ME,ED,GR)	 (2)	
where	F	is	expected	to	be	positively	related	to	ME,	ED	and	GR.	
Of	course,	the	position	taken	by	the	governments	of	most	LDCs	is	usually	not	stated	as	
explicitly	as	this.	However,	estimating	equation	(2)	does	represent	fairly	the	stand	implicitly	
taken	by	most	of	these	governments.	Differences	may	arise	over	the	relative	importance	of	
the	various	determinants	but	all	assume	that	the	provision	of	tax	incentives	to	be	a	
necessary,	though	not	sufficient,	condition	for	attracting	direct	foreign	investment.	
II	
Equation	(2)	was	used	to	test	the	validity	of	these	ideas	for	a	group	of	twenty	seven	LDCs	for	
the	period	1965-73.1	F	is	measured	by	the	average	of	the	annual	per	capita	total	direct	
foreign	investment	for	the	period	1965-73	in	US	dollars.	
IG	is	a	dummy	variable	for	the	generosity	of	the	incentive	package	offered	by	the	LDC.	
Incentives	can	be	divided	conveniently	into	three	groups.	The	first	is	the	pure	tax	holiday,	
which	exempts	firms	from	the	prevailing	corporate	tax	for	a	certain	period.	The	second	is	a	
modified	tax	holiday,	whose	duration	and	therefore	value	depends	on	the	investment	level.	
The	third	category	consists	of	cost-lowering	incentives,	of	which	the	accelerated	
depreciation	allowance.	the	investment	allowance,	and	the	investment	subsidy	are	the	most	
common.	
It	has	been	argued	that	if	the	provision	of	tax	incentives	does	stimulate	direct	foreign	
investment,	then	the	granting	of	cost-lowering	incentives	has	a	greater	stimulative	effect	
than	the	granting	of	the	pure	or	the	modified	tax	holiday.2	First,	tax	holidays	provide	a	
‘perverse'	subsidy,	providing	little	assistance	when	assistance	is	needed	(that	is,	for	firms	
making	little	or	no	profits)	and	a	great	deal	of	assistance	when	assistance	is	not	needed	
(that	is,	for	firms	making	a	great	deal	of	profits).	Second,	their	time—perspective	is	too	
limited.	It	is	granted	under	the	assumption	that	firms	maximize	profits	in	the	short-run	and	
that	such	profit	expectations	are	formulated	clearly	enough	for	the	effects	of	the	tax	holiday	
to	be	considered	meaningfully.	Finns	which	extend	their	investment	plans	over	a	long	period	
may	not	find	any	incentive	in	having	tax	exemption	over	the	normal	period	of	two	to	five	
years.	If	the	exemption	period	is	extended	over	a	time-span	over	which	most	of	these	firms	
become	profitable.	then	the	exemption	becomes	meaningless	in	terms	of	need.	These	firms	
may	thus	find	cost-lowering	incentives	to	be	more	attractive.	These	incentives	are	granted	
with	a	much	longer	and	a	much	less	precise	profit—perspective	in	mind	as	they	are	meant	
primarily	to	lower	the	costs	of	production	in	the	often	difficult	early	years	of	operation.	
Third,	unlike	the	cost-lowering	incentives	the	tax	holiday	offers	little	incentive	to	risky	
investment	programmes	as	the	subsidy	it	provides	only	materializes	when	profits	are	made.	
These	considerations	of	time-perspectives	and	risks	may	have	special	relevance	in	attracting	
private	foreign	investment.	The	implicit	assumption	behind	granting	tax	holidays	to	private	
foreign	investors	is	that	they	require	maximum	profits	in	the	short-run	and	that	a	relief	from	
the	normal	incidence	of	corporate	taxation	is	the	most	efficient	way	of	achieving	this	and	
hence	of	maximizing	the	flow	of	foreign	investment	capital.	This	assumption	may	be	
justified	for	those	small	firms	which	are	neither	subsidiaries	nor	associates	of	large	
international	companies	but	may	not	be	consistent	with	the	rationale	of	the	investment	
decisions	of	a	large	number	of	firms	with	international	interests.	
These	considerations	suggest	the	following	measure	of	1G.	A	value	of	1	is	given	to	each	of	
the	27	LDCs	that	provide	tax	holidays	in	the	pure	or	the	modified	form.	while	a	value	of	2	is	
given	to	each	of	those	that	provide	cost-	lowering	incentives.	Some	of	the	LDCs	offer	both	
tax	holidays	and	cost-	lowering	incentives.	A	value	of	3	is	given	to	each	one	of	these:	other	
things	being	equal,	the	more	diverse	the	types	of	incentives	given	the	larger	the	range	of	
motives	satisfied	and	so	the	larger	the	number	of	investors	attracted.	Thus	LDCs	which	give	
the	most	generous	package	of	incentives	will	be	assigned	the	value	3	in	the	measurement	of	
IG,	those	with	the	second	most	generous	the	value	2	and	those	with	the	least	generous	the	
value	1.3	F	and	IG	are	expected	by	the	governments	of	LDCs	to	be	positively	related.	
ME	is	the	average	of	the	annual	percentage	shares	of	minerals	in	the	LDCs	total	
merchandise	exports	over	the	period	1965-73.	It	was	‘used	to	test	for	the	influence	of	the	
availability	of	non-human	resources	in	attracting	direct	foreign	investment.	F	and	ME	are	
expected	to	be	positively	related.	
Two	variables	were	used	to	capture	the	influence	of	proven	economic	performance	in	
attracting	direct	foreign	investment.	The	first	is	ED,	the	level	of	economic	development	in	
the	period	prior	to	the	investment	being	made.	Other	things	being	equal,	the	higher	.the	
level	of	economic	development,	the	greater	the	domestic	market	and	the	better	the	
infrastructural	facilities	and	so	the	greater	the	opportunities	for	making	profits	and	the	
incentive	to	invest.	ED	is	measured	by	the	average	of	the	per	capita	GDP	in	US	dollars,	at	
1967-69	market	prices	and	exchange	rates,	for	the	period	1960-65.	It	is	expected	to	be	
positively	related	to	F.	
The	second	variable	is	GR,	the	rate	of	economic	growth.	The	argument	is	that,	ceteris	
paribus,	a	more	rapidly	growing	economy	provides	greater	profit	opportunities	than	an	
economy	that	is	growing	slowly	or	not	at	all.	Foreign	investors	may	find	it	financially	
attractive	to	invest	in	a	LDC	with	a	low	per	capita	income	that	has	experienced	rapid	
economic	growth	recently.	The	recent	favourable	economic	performance	may	reflect	the	
adoption	of	more	rational	policies	by	the	government	and	may	offset	the	adverse	effect	that	
a	low	per	capita	income,	the	result	of	past	neglect	and	inefficiency,	has	on	investment.	Of	
course,	a	LDC	with	a	high	per	capita	income	and	rapid	economic	growth	will	be	preferred	to	
one	that	enjoys	only	one	of	the	two	attributes.	The	economic	performance	variable	is	
measured	in	two	ways.	The	first	is	the	average	annual	growth	rate	of	the	real	per	capita	GDP	
over	the	period	1960-65	(GR1).	The	second,	the	average	annual	growth	rate	of	the	real	GDP	
over	the	period	1960-65	(GR2),	is	a	much	less	demanding	measure	of	economic	
performance	but	may	still	be	useful	as	it	indicates	the	direction	that	the	economy	must	go	
before	improvements	in	the	average	standard	of	living	can	be	brought	about.	GR,	and	GR,	
are	expected	to	be	positively	related	to	F.	
The	following	equations	were	obtained,	by	ordinary	least	squares,	using	the	logarithmic	
formulation	of	equation	(2):	
	 	
	
The	figures	in	parentheses	are	r	values	and	statistical	significance	at	the	0.005	and	0.01	
confidence	levels	are	indicated	by	*	and	**	respectively.	
The	coefficients	of	ME	are	positive.	as	expected,	and	statistically	significant.	This	confirms	
the	view	that	the	presence	of	natural	resources	is	an	important	factor	in	persuading	foreign	
investors	to	invest	in	LDCs.	
The	Coefficients	of	ED	and	GR	came	out	with	the	expected	positive	sign	but	only	those	for	
ED	are	significant.	This	suggests	that	foreign	investors	were	more	concerned	with	proven	
economic	performance	over	a	long	period	of	time	(which	produces	a	high	per	capita	
income)	than	with	recent	economic	performance	(which	produces	a	high	growth	rate	over	
the	period	concerned)	in	deciding	whether	or	not	to	invest.	
The	coefficients	of	IG	appeared	with	the	totally	unexpected	negative	sign	and,	equally	
important.	were	statistically	significant.	These	results,	together	with	those	for	ME	and	ED.	
suggest	that	for	those	LDCs	which	offered	generous	tax	incentives.	the	level	of	direct	foreign	
investment	was	discouraged	beyond	the	level	that	was	determined	by	the	lack	of	natural	
resources	and	general	economic	growth.	In	other	words,	fiscal	hyper-	generosity	was	seen	
by	potential	foreign	investors	as	a	danger	signal	(a	disincentive)	and	not	as	a	lure	(an	
incentive).	
A	closer	look	at	the	results	shows,	however,	that	this	interpretation	is	a	rather	extreme	one.	
A	more	reasonable	explanation	may	be	found	in	a	recent	paper	by	Shah	and	Toye	[1978].4	
After	a	survey	of	the	theoretical	and	empirical	literature.	they	concluded	that	the	
effectiveness	of	fiscal	incentives	in	increasing	the	level	of	investment	in	LDCs	was	either	
slight	or	unknown.	They.	therefore.	found	it	rather	strange	that	fiscal	incentives	were	used	
so	extensively	in	LDCs	and	offered	some	interesting	explanations	for	this	‘apparent	
paradox’.	
One	of	these	explanations	may	be	called	the	illusory	compensating	effect.	It	centres	round	
the	intense	efforts	by	the	LDCs	lacking	in	resource	endowments	and	technological	and	
labour	skills	to	encourage	direct	foreign	investment.	In	order	to	compensate	for	the	lack	of	
such	resources	these	countries	offer	investment	incentives.	and	competition	among	them	
over	time	results	in	ever	more	generous	incentives	being	given.	According	to	Shah	and	Toye.	
‘as	this	happens.	the	foreign	firms	decide	where	and	how	much	to	invest	in	accordance	with	
non-tax	criteria,	knowing	that	they	will	pay	precious	little	to	the	exchequer	wherever	they	
go’.5	Thus	the	compensating	effect	is	only	an	illusory	one.	
According	to	this	explanation.	the	provision	of	incentives	per	se	does	not	encourage	a	
higher	level	of	direct	foreign	investment.	It	is	the	influence	of	non-tax	factors	that	matters.	
In	the	symbols	used	in	this	paper.	the	illusory	compensating	effect	can	be	represented	by	
the	following	two	hypotheses:	
(1)		 F	is	positively	related	to	ME	and	ED	because	direct	foreign	investment	is	
determined	by	non-tax	factors;	
(2)		 IG	is	inversely	related	to	ME	and	ED	because	the	absence	of	natural	resources	
and	economic	growth	encourages	LDCs	to	be	extra	generous	in	the	incentives	
they	provide.	
The	inverse	and	statistically	significant	relationship	between	F	and	IG	can	be	derived	as	a	
logical	implication	of	the	above	two	hypotheses.	Thus,	if	F	is	positively	related	to	ME	and	ED,	
and	IG	is	negatively	related	to	ME	and	ED,	then	F	and	IG	are	negatively	related.	Presented	in	
this	way,	the	inverse	relationship	between	F	and	IG	is	purely	a	statistical	one,	and	has	no	
behavioural	significance	in	its	own	right.	On	balance,	the	Shah-Toye	hypothesis	of	the	
illusory	compensating	effect	appears	more	acceptable	than	the	hypothesis	that	foreign	
investors	see	fiscal	hyper-generosity	as	a	sign	of	economic	desperation	and	so	tend	to=	stay	
shy	of	those	LDCs	which	offer	the	most	generous	incentives.	
For	the	analysis	as	a	whole,	the	values	of	the	F-ratio	show	that	the	two	regression	equations	
are	statistically	significant.	The	values	of	the	adjusted	coefficient	of	determination	(R2)	are	
not	particularly	low	for	cross-country	studies	of	this	nature.	That	they	are	not	higher	may	be	
explained	by	the	fact	that	certain	of	the	determinants	most	frequently	mentioned	by	
foreign	investors	have	not	been	included	in	the	estimating	equation.	The	most	important	of	
these	are	political	stability,	the	provision	of	favourable	terms	for	the	transfer	of	profits	and	
the	repatriation	of	capital,	freedom	from	detailed	and	burdensome	bureaucratic	control,	
and	the	formulation	and	the	implementation	of	a	development	plan.	The	data	for	these	
variables	are	not	available	and	when	they	are	they	cannot	be	quantified	easily	or	
meaningfully.	
III	
The	results	suggest	that	there	is	some	support	for	Shah-Toye’s	illusory	compensating	effect	
in	explaining	the	widespread	use	of	incentives	in	spite	of	their	slight	or	unknown	stimulative	
effect	on	direct	foreign	investment.		
However,	this	must	remain	a	tentative	conclusion	in	view	of	a	number	of	limitations	of	the	
study.	First,	the	sample	of	LDCs	used	is	rather	small	and	could	have	done	with	a	few	more	
countries	that	offer	only	cost-lowering	incentives.	Second,	the	method	used	in	measuring	
the	generosity	of	the	incentives	granted	is	rather	crude,	so	that	the	figures	obtained	for	the	
regression	coefficients	of	1G	must	be	interpreted	with	care.	In	defence	of	the	measure	used,	
it	can	be	said	that	the	actual	cost	of	fiscal	incentives	to	the	exchequer	is	usually	totally	
invisible	and	it	is	very	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	obtain	reliable	estimates	of	such	costs	
for	even	a	‘smallish’	group	of	27	LDCs.	
NOTES	
1. These	are	Afghanistan	(1),	Bangladesh	(3).	Barbados	(3),	Ecuador	(3),	Fiji	(3),	Ghana	
(1),	Guyana	(3),	India	(3),	Indonesia	(1),	Ivory	Coast	(1),	Jamaica	(3),	Malaysia	(3),	
Mauritius	(1),	Niger	(1),	Nigeria	(1),	Pakistan	(3),	Paraguay	(1),	Peru	(1),	Senegal	(1).	
Sierra	Leone	(1),	Singapore	(3).	Sri	Lanka	(3),	Sudan	(1),	Tanzania	(2),	Trinidad	and	
Tobago	(3),	Uruguay	(1),	and	Zambia	(2).	The	data	for	the	analysis	came	from	the	
World	Bank	[1976].	For	an	explanation	of	the	number	inserted	after	each	country.	
see	note	3.	
2. See	Fromm	[197]].	and	Bird	and	Oldman	[I975].	
3. The	type	of	incentives	given	by	each	of	the	27	countries	in	the	sample	is	indicated	by	
the	number	after	each	of	the	LDCs	listed	in	note	1.	The	27	LDCS	have	been	chosen	
for	our	analysis	because	there	is	a	very	detailed	and	systematic	description	of	the	
incentives	offered	by	these	countries	in	Shah	and	Toye	[1	978].	This	description	
enables	a	meaningful	classification	of	the	LDCS	by	the	type	of	incentives	offered.	
4. Ibid.	
5. Ibid.,	285.	
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